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Combining the Components of Life: The Application of
Patent ExtraterritorialityDoctrine to Biotechnology
JENNIFER L. SCHUSTER*
INTRODUCTION

Within the past century, scientific advancement has greatly expanded the range of
patentable subject matter,' famously described as including "anything under the sun
that is made by man." 2 The discovery of the double-helical structure of3
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) by James Watson and Francis Crick in the early 1950s
led to the establishment of an entirely new field of science-biotechnology-which
also profoundly changed the face of scientific fields such as medicine 4 and6
agriculture. 5 Soon, scientists who had created novel, useful, and nonobvious
inventions utilizing this new technology sought limited-term monopoly7 rights under
the patent laws of the United States, and the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in
8
Diamond v. Chakrabarty
affixed the Court's seal of approval on biotech patents. 9
Inevitably, as soon as patents are granted, accusations of infringement arise. Under
the Patent Act, one can infringe another's patent by usurping a patentee's rights
directly,'0 inducing others to infringe the patent," or otherwise contributing to
* J.D. Candidate, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, 2008; M.S., 2005,
B.S., B.A., 2004, Purdue University. I would like to thank Professor Kevin E. Collins for his
commentary on an earlier draft of this Note. I also would like to thank my parents, Bert and Sue
Schuster, for helping me become a better writer, starting with my first elementary school
assignments.

1. Inventors may patent "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
2. Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 37 (1951) (statement of P.J. Federico, Chief

Examiner, Patent Office). Natural phenomena, laws of nature, and abstract ideas cannot be
patented. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
3. See J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, MolecularStructure of Nucleic Acids: A Structurefor
Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737,737 (1953).
4. See, e.g., C. Semsarian & C.E. Seidman, Molecular Medicine in the 21st Century, 31

INTERNAL MED. J. 53, 53 (2001) (observing that increased scientific understanding of genetic
disorders will assist medical researchers in developing pharmaceutical and gene-therapy-based
treatments for such diseases).
5. See, e.g., W. Paul Davies, An HistoricalPerspectivefrom the Green Revolution to the
Gene Revolution, 61 NuTUTION REvs. 124, 124 (2003) (observing the increasing impact of

genetics and biotechnology on agriculture).
6. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (requiring that a patentable invention possess novelty); 35
U.S.C. § 103 (2000) (requiring that a patentable invention not be obvious "to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains").
7. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000).
8. 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (holding that a genetically engineered bacterium containing
plasmid DNA allowing it to digest crude oil was patentable).
9. See Robert G. Sterne & Lawrence B. Bugaisky, The Expansion of Statutory Subject
Matter Under the 1952 PatentAct, 37 AKRON L. REv. 217, 224 (2004).

10. See 35 U.S.C.

§ 271(a) (2000).

11. See 35 U.S.C.

§ 271(b) (2000).
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infringing activities.' 2 However, until 1984, the Patent Act only protected patentees
from infringement occurring within the United States and its territories or involving the
importation of patented products (including those made by patented processes).' 3 Thus,
an infringer could avoid United States patent law entirely by conducting some aspect
of manufacturing overseas. Such was the case in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp.,14 in which the Supreme Court held that exporting components of a patented
invention that15were then assembled into the final product abroad did not constitute
infringement.
In 1984, Congress responded to Deepsouth 6 by enacting 35 U.S.C. § 271 (f), which
expanded the range of infringing behaviors to include some activities occurring
abroad:
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the
United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented
invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such
manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the
United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or
especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is
uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or
adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such
combination
17
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit expanded the scope of
§ 271(f), 8 which it initially applied only to the export of tangible components of
product patents.' 9 In general, product patents are defined as machines, manufactures, or

12. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
14. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
15. See id. at 528-29 ("No wrong is done the patentee until the combination is formed ....

Only when such association is made is there a direct infringement of his monopoly, and not
even then if it is done outside the territory for which the monopoly was granted.") (quoting
Radio Corp. of Am. v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir. 1935)).
16. 130 CONG. REc. 28065, 28069 (1984) ("This proposal responds to the United States
Supreme Court decision in Deepsouth PackingCo. v.Laitram Corp. . .. concerning the need for
a legislative solution to close a loophole in patent law.") (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000).
18. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created in 1982, has exclusive jurisdiction
over appellate patent litigation. See KENNETH J.BURCHFIEL, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT 5 (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. ed., 1995).
19. See, e.g., Columbia Univ. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 150 F. Supp. 2d 191, 204-05
(D. Mass. 2001) (holding that § 271(f) does not apply to process patents, because they do not
claim any components that an infringer may combine abroad) (citing Standard Havens Prods.,
Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
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compositions of matter.2 ° Process patents, on the other hand, claim no tangible entity,
but instead a series of actions or steps that produce a useful result." In Eolas
Technologies v. Microsoft Corp.,22 the court first contemplated applying § 271(f) to
process patents23 and expanded the definition of "component" to include intangible
elements of a patented invention (software).24 Expanding § 271(f) liability to intangible
components of a patent will affect many different fields of technology, including
biotechnology. 25 The Federal Circuit has never addressed § 271 (f) in a biotech context,
but given the increasing number of biotech and pharmaceutical patent disputes,2 6 it
seems likely that the statute will come into play in this context in the future.
This Note predicts how courts might apply § 271(f) to different patented biotech
inventions. This is a natural extension of the doctrine 27 because biological materials are
reproduced in a manner that is very similar to the copying of software,28 often
involving informational precursors that do not physically become part of a final
product and are thus "intangible" in the same manner as software code. Part I examines
the basic science of biotechnology and reviews the Federal Circuit's traditionally
narrow approach to patentability and infringement issues involving biotech. Part II
summarizes the history of 35 U.S.C. § 271 (f), the Federal Circuit cases expanding its

20.

DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §

1.02 (2006).

21. Id.§ 1.03.
22. 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
23. "This statutory language did not limit section 27 1(f) to patented 'machines' or patented
'physical structures.' Rather every form of invention eligible for patenting falls within the
protection of section 271 (f)." Id. at 1339. Though Eolas did not involve a process patent, the
court later held that § 271 (f) could apply to these patents. See Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics
Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[B]ecause § 271 (f) govems
method/process inventions, Shell's exportation of catalysts may result in liability under §
271(f).").
24. Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1339. In Eolas, the court held that software code on a golden master
disk could be a component under § 271 (f) because, without this code, "the invention would not
work at all and thus would not even qualify as new and useful." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 299 F. Supp. 2d 550, 553 (E.D. Va.
2003) (holding that the software code on a golden master disk was a component under § 271(f)
because it was "the functional nucleus of the finished computer product").
25. See Dennis Crouch, PATENTLY-O, Dec. 19, 2006, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/
2006/12/microsoft_v att.html; Dennis Crouch, PATENTLY-O, Oct. 1, 2006,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/1 0/supreme court_l.html.
26. See, e.g., Company Releases 2005 Report on Biotech and PharmaceuticalPatent
Trends, BIOTECH WK. 345, July 20,2005, availableat 2005 WLNR 11062740 ("Patent litigation

has continued at a modest, steady increase, a likely reflection of the continued recognition of the
increased value of intellectual property assets. Biotech and pharmaceutical patent litigation
appear consistent with this trend.").
27. See Michael R. Dzwonczyk, Looking atFederalCircuitDevelopments 2005: The Year

in Review, 6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 113, 118-19 (2006) ("Is the manufacturer of a host cell
transformed in the U.S. and thereafter exported for protein expression and production liable for
infringement of a patent claiming a method of producing proteins under § 271 (f)?"); Virginia
Zaunbrecher, Note, Eolas,A T&T, & Union Carbide:The New Extraterritorialityof US.Patent

Law,21

BERKELEY TECH. L.J.

33, 55 n.136 (2006).

28. See Andrew Hughes, The Central Dogma and Basic Transcription,http://cnx.org/

content/mI 1415/1.5/ (analogizing the system of genetic transcription and translation to
computer processes).
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applicability, and the Supreme Court's recent decision in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp. Finally, Part III predicts how modem courts might approach § 271(f) liability in
this area and explains why an expansive application of§ 271(0 would undermine the
Federal Circuit's traditionally narrow approach to biotech patent rights. Part III
concludes by explaining why a biotech-specific amendment to § 271(0 would most
effectively address this problem.
I. BIOTECHNOLOGY: A PATENT PRIMER

A. The CentralDogma
The genetic material of a living organism is composed of polymeric chains of
nucleic acids that encode information vital to its survival 29 through genes-finite units
carrying inherited information about a particular biological function or trait. 30 Genes
alone do not have any purpose but information storage; the information encoded by a
gene sequence must take another form before it can execute any biological function.
The informational content of the genetic code is very similar to that of any other
language. From the four standard nucleotide bases contained by DNA-guanine (G),
adenine (A), cytosine (C), and thymine (T) 3 1-a wide variety of different messages can
form. The "words" contained within the "sentence" of any given gene consist of three
bases each-short sequences known as "codons"-and correspond to a particular
amino acid at a particular location within the protein produced from the gene. Other
specialized codons communicate where the protein-coding region ofa gene begins and
ends.32
Shortly after the elucidation of the structure of DNA,33 Francis Crick predicted how
cells utilized this genetic information; his theory is now commonly known as the
"Central Dogma." 34 In this system, individual genes made of DNA are first transcribed

29. Nucleic acids are composed of heterocyclic nitrogenous bases and are the core building
blocks of the genetic code and the information it stores and transfers. See REGINALD H.
GARRETr & CHARLES M. GRISHAM, BIOCHEMISTRY 327 (Univ. of Va. ed., Sanders College

Publishing 2d ed. 1999).
30. Id.at 950-51.
31. See id.
at 328-29. Thymine is replaced by uracil (U) in RNA. See id. at 329.
32. So, for example, the coding DNA sequence
5' ATG CAA GGA TGT AT" ACT GAG CGC CTG TCA TAG 3'
would be transcribed into the following mRNA:
5' AUG CAA GGA UGU AUU ACU GAG CGC CUG UCA UAG 3'
which would be "read" by ribosomes and translated into the following protein:

N-Met--Glu---Gly--Cys-Ile-Thr---Glu-Arg-Leu-Ser-C
AUG serves both as the "start" signal and encodes for the amino acid methionine; UAG is one
of three "stop" codons. In addition, the genetic code is degenerate-all amino acids are
represented by more than one codon (except for methionine and tryptophan). See generally id.
at 1073-74.5' and 3' markers indicate the polarity of nucleic acids, with genes read by cellular
machinery from 5' to 3'. N and C markers indicate the polarity of proteins, with translation
occurring in an N- to C-terminal fashion. See id.at 113-14; JAMES D. WATSON, MICHAEL
GILMAN, JAN WITKOWSI & MARK ZOLLER, RECOMBINANT DNA 39-40 (2d ed. 1992).

33. See supra text accompanying note 3.
34. GARRETr & GRISHAM, supra note 29, at 1014.
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into molecules of ribonucleic acid (RNA) 35-small and relatively instable 36 nucleic
acid polymers. These messenger RNA (mRNA) molecules then interact with
ribosomes, which facilitate the translation of the 37
genetic code into functional proteins
through the assembly of individual amino acids.
As understanding of the Central Dogma increased, so did researchers' ability to
manipulate biological molecules. Genetic sequencing techniques allowed scientists to
understand not only individual gene sequences but also the structure and makeup of
entire genomes 38 and advanced the state of the field considerably. 39 One major
breakthrough was the discovery of restriction enzymes-proteins that cleave nucleic
41
40
acid molecules at specific sequences. In addition to streamlining DNA sequencing,
restriction enzymes also allowed researchers to create novel DNA sequences by cutting
different molecules of DNA with the same restriction enzyme and then reassembling
the fragments to form a chimeric DNA sequence.42 Researchers also have utilized
restriction enzyme technology to insert foreign genes into cloning vectors and

35. The three major forms of RNA are messenger RNA (mRNA), ribosomal RNA (rRNA),
and transfer RNA (tRNA). All of the three major types of RNA are involved in protein
synthesis. Id. at 1015. However, for the purposes of this Note, mRNA, which is formed from
protein-coding genes in an organism's DNA, is the most important, since it serves as an
informational precursor to the final protein product encoded by a gene.
36. The instability of mRNA in a cellular environment allows the rate of protein synthesis
to be controlled by the rate of transcription of DNA into mRNA. See id. Thus, the protein
encoded by any given gene will only be produced while the cellular machinery actively
transcribes that gene into mRNA, a process which is regulated by features contained by
genomic DNA and also by hundreds of different proteins known as "transcription factors." See
generally id. at 1028-56.
37. Id. at 1015.
38. "Genome" refers to all of an organism's genetic material. See id. at 23.
39. See WATSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 63.
40. Restriction endonuclease enzymes, which cut nucleic acid molecules internally at
particular sequences, were discovered in various species of bacteria that utilized them as
protection against viruses. The enzyme would recognize the viral nucleic acid at a particular
sequence (the "restriction site"), cut the nucleic acid at that site, and thus prevent infection by
destroying the virus's genetic material. The bacteria's own genetic material would remain
untouched due to certain chemical modifications present at the restriction site on its own
genome. See id. at 64-65.
41. See id. at 67.
42. Preferred restriction enzymes used for this purpose are those which create singlestranded "sticky ends" when cutting. For example, the commonly used restriction enzyme
EcoRl (derived from the bacterium Escherichiacoli) cuts at the following double-stranded DNA
site:
5' GA AT T C 3'
3' CT TA AG 5'
to create the following pieces of DNA with a short single-stranded overhang at the 5' end ofthe
DNA:
5'GA3' 5'ATTC3'
3'CTTA5' 3'AG 5'
Any nucleic acid sequence that has been cut with EcoRi enzyme can then be combined with
other sequences cut by the same enzyme, allowing the creation of novel nucleic acid sequences.
See id. at 70-72.
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introduce them into different species of cells, 43 allowing for the creation of genetically
engineered cell lines. The Supreme Court addressed the patentability of such
organisms in the landmark case Diamondv. Chakrabarty,44 in which the inventor had
claimed Pseudomonasbacteria that contained two such man-made plasmid vectors.45
The isolation of genes using recombinant technology not only allowed scientists to
learn more about the genes themselves but also opened the door to studying the
structure and function of the proteins they produce. Today, scientists utilize a wide
variety of protein expression systems to allow for the isolation and study ofproteins in
the laboratory. 4 Additionally, technology has enabled scientists to create mutated
forms of genes in order to study how individual amino acid residues contribute to the
structure and function of a particular protein.47
Recombinant DNA techniques also have combined nicely with the use of
polymerase chain reaction (PCR), which allows researchers to amplify small samples
of nucleic acid (both DNA and RNA) into larger amounts more compatible with
laboratory research.48 PCR itself and its many variations are claimed by numerous
process patents, 49 but also have aided in the creation of many patented biotech

43. A plasmid is one commonly used vector, consisting of a small, self-replicating piece of
circular DNA. Plasmids containing many restriction enzyme recognition sites are highly useful
for inserting DNA restriction fragments into the plasmids. These recombinant plasmids can then
be introduced into host cells to produce more of the plasmid or to express the protein encoded
by the gene. See id. at 73-74.
44. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
45. Id. at 305.

46. Many laboratory systems of expressing recombinant proteins are claimed by process
patents, causing researchers to lament "multiple licensing agreements [that] may deter
companies that do not possess patented in-house technologies from selecting this bacterium as a
production host." Mima Mujacic & Frangois Baneyx, Expression, Folding,andDegradationin
Escherichia coli, in PROTEIN EXPRESSION TECHNOLOGIES: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE TRENDS

85, 86 (Franqois Baneyx ed., 2004). Expression systems are characterized by the use of living
cells and an expression plasmid with various characteristics, such as the presence ofa particular
restriction enzyme site and a strong promoter region (the DNA sequence where the RNA
polymerase enzyme binds to begin the process of transcription). See id. at 85-92. Common
systems used for protein expression involve the cells of bacteria (such as Escherichiacoli),
yeast, insects, and mammals.
47. See WATSON ETAL., supranote 32, at 192 (describing in vitro mutagenesis techniques).
48. See id. at 79-80. PCR of DNA generally consists of three steps: first, denaturation
("melting") of the double-stranded DNA template molecule at high temperatures; second,
annealing of primers (short pieces of single-stranded nucleic acid that are complimentary to the
endpoints of the sequence to be amplified); and third, synthesis of a new strand of DNA from
the original template from a mixture of nucleotides. These three steps are repeated many times
in order to exponentially amplify the amount of the target DNA sequence. The key ingredient in
PCR is the heat-stable DNA polymerase Taq, isolated from Thermophilusaquaticus,a bacterial
species found in oceanic hot springs, which maintains its functionality despite the high

temperatures used for denaturation (about 94°C) that would deactivate most enzymes. See id. at
80-85.
49. See David McDowell, The PolymeraseChainReactionPatents:Going, Going,... Still
Going, 99 J. ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 62, 62 (2006). The expiration of the first PCR patents both in

the United States and abroad seems likely to expand molecular research given that use of this
cornerstone technology will no longer be limited to those who can afford to pay licensing fees
on the technology. Id. at 63. However, patents on Taq polymerase and other variations on PCR,
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inventions. 50 PCR variations can be used to produce DNA from mRNA 51 or to measure
the concentration of a certain DNA or mRNA sequence present in a particular
sample.52
B. Patentson Biotech Inventions
The biotech revolution has produced inventions that are accompanied by unique
patent law issues. 53 Still, these inventions must satisfy the basic statutory requirements
of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness, and an inventor must provide a sufficient
written disclosure, 54 for patentability. The Federal Circuit has struggled with the
application of these requirements to biotech inventions, but has settled on a narrow
interpretation of patent rights in this field.
1. Patentable Subject Matter
Professor Rebecca Eisenberg has suggested that many find it difficult to accept the
patentability of biotech inventions (especially DNA sequences) because of their
informational content. Pure information on its own is unpatentable 56 unless it is
converted into an invention that falls into the categories of patentable subject matter

such as real-time and reverse-transcriptase PCR, are still in force and will continue to affect
biotech research. See id. at 63-64.
50. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,153,856 (filed May 26, 2005) (describing the utilization of
PCR techniques to assay the tyrosine kinase genes claimed by the patent); U.S. Patent No.
7,154,021 (filed Jan. 5, 2001) (describing the creation of the claimed invention, genetically
engineered soybean plants, using PCR techniques). A search using the term "polymerase chain
reaction" within the specifications or descriptions of all patents on the United States Patent and
Trademark Office's Web database yielded over twenty-eight thousand results. United States
Patent and Trademark Office Full-Text Database Boolean Search, http://patft.uspto.gov/
netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html.
51. This form of PCR utilizes reverse transcriptase, an enzyme used by retroviruses to
produce DNA from an RNA template. GARRETr & GRISHAM, supra note 29, at 1008-09; see
also Ursula E.M. Gibson, Christian A. Heid & P. Mickey Williams, A Novel Methodfor Real
Time Quantitative RT-PCR, 6 GENOME RES. 995, 995 (1996) (describing the use of reverse
transcriptase in a real-time quantitative PCR protocol to measure amounts of mRNA in a cell).
52. See Christian A. Heid, Junko Stevens, Kenneth J. Livak & P. Mickey Williams, Real
Time QuantitativePCR, 6 GENOME RES. 986,986-87 (1996) (describing real-time quantitative
PCR techniques).
53. The diversity of inventions created by biotech innovation made it difficult for courts to
apply a uniform standard in the early days of the biotech revolution. See PHILIPPE G. DUCOR,
PATENTING THE RECOMBINANT PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND OTHER MOLECULES 1 (1998).
54. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
55. See BURCHFtEL, supra note 18, at 3.
56. See Symposium, Molecules vs. Information:Should PatentsProtectBoth?, 8 B.U. J.
Sci. & TECH. L. 190, 195 (2002) [hereinafter Molecules] ("[T]he subject matter of patents is
limited to material products and processes and does not extend to knowledge and information
about the world."). For biotechnology, this seems counterintuitive, as the claimed subject matter
(for example, a particular DNA sequence) is likely to be more valuable to scientists for its
informational content, which becomes public after a patent is granted, than for any tangible
sample of the nucleic acid that can be used in a lab. See id. at 198-99.
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listed in 35 U.S.C. § 101.5 7 However, despite this, patents claiming a DNA sequence,
even without a physical embodiment of that sequence, typically are allowed by the
PTO and are enforced by courts58because of the link between the tangible nucleic acid
and the information it encodes.
Defining the nature of the claimed subject matter of biotech inventions can also be
difficult. For example, if an inventor claimed a genetically engineered cell line in a
product patent, would such a patent also provide monopoly rights with regard to any
processes performed by the cell line? The Federal Circuit addressed this question in
Amgen v. UnitedStates InternationalTrade Commission,59 holding that "[a] host cell

claim does not 'cover' intracellular processes any more 6or
less than a claim to a
0
machine 'covers' the process performed by that machine."
Under the umbrella of product patents, inventors may claim such biological
products as proteins, 61 DNA sequences (including both protein-coding sequences and
other sequences, such as plasmid vectors optimized for gene expression), and
genetically engineered cell lines. 62 Process claims can include methods of working
with genetic material (such as protocols for cell transformation, gene sequencing, or
PCR 63), cell culture methods, and systems of protein expression and purification. 64
2. Utility
All patented inventions must possess utility. 65 PTO Guidelines indicate that for 'an
66
invention to be patentable, it must possess "specific, substantial, and credible utility.

57. See id.
58. See Eileen M. Kane, Splittingthe Gene:DNA Patentsand the Genetic Code, 71 TENN.

L. REv. 707, 744 (2004).
59. 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
60. Id. at 1538 (internal footnotes omitted).
61. For an in-depth discussion of the patentability of proteins produced by recombinant
genetic material, see generally David E. Huizenga, Comment, P Protein Variants:A Study on
the Differing StandardsforBiotechnology Patentsin the United States andEurope, 13 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 629, 655-63 (1999).

62. See BURCHFIEL, supra note 18, at 21-22.
63. See McDowell, supra note 49, at 63.
64. See BURCHFIEL, supra note 18, at 25-26. If a gene has been isolated and inserted into a
host cell to express the protein it encodes, the following are all patentable: the recombinant
protein itself, the isolated genetic material, and the cell line containing the expression vector
with the isolated gene. See id. at 20.
65. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor .... ") (emphasis added). The utility requirement typically
mandates that the inventor demonstrate that the invention possess both operability (the ability to
create the result described by the specification) and practical utility ("real-world" benefits
provided by the invention). See BURCHFIEL, supra note 18, at 48-50.
66. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1094 (Jan. 5, 2001) ("The utility
requirement, as explained by the courts, only requires that the inventor disclose a practical or
real world benefit available from the invention, i.e., a specific, substantial and credible utility.");
see also KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 20-23 (The
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. ed., Supp. 2005) [hereinafter BuRCHFiEL SUPPLEMENT].
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For example, in Brennerv. Manson,67 the Supreme Court held that a researcher could
not patent a chemical compound merely because it had the potential to exhibit anti68
tumor activity without scientific evidence that it actually demonstrated such activity.
The Federal Circuit generally has adhered to this requirement when considering the
utility of biotech inventions. 69 Absolute proof of utility is usually not required-for
example, in Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp.,70 the court held that expert testimony
about a method for assaying a particular type of protein activity was sufficient to
justify the district court's finding that the claimed recombinant protein possessed
practical utility. 71 However, in In re Fisher,72 the court held that an inventor could not
73
patent expressed sequence tags
if their utility (and that of the genes from which they
74
were derived) was unknown.
Professor Eisenberg has observed that the value of many biotech patents lies
increasingly in their informational content, not in their potential use as templates to
produce proteins. 75 Without knowing specifically the function of a particular gene
sequence, an inventor will be ill-equipped to draft claims of the proper scope, to
distinguish the sequence from very similar sequences present in the prior art, or to
establish sufficient utility for patentability.76 Thus, enforcing a strict utility requirement
makes sense to prevent overbroad patent protection on DNA sequences of unknown
function in order to avoid stifling innovation.

67. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).

68. Id. at 531-32. The Court rejected the inventor's argument that structural similarity to a
known anti-tumor compound made his claimed compound likely also to exhibit the same
properties. "Indeed, respondent himself recognized that the presumption that adjacent
homologues have the same utility has been challenged in the steroid field because of a greater
known unpredictability of compounds in that field." Id. at 532 (internal footnote omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
69. But see Jordan Paradise, Lori Andrews & Timothy Holbrook, Patents on Human
Genes: An Analysis of Scope and Claims, 307 Sci. 1566, 1566 (2005) (suggesting that many
issued patents on human genes do not have sufficient utility for patentability).
70. 220 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also BURCHFIEL SUPPLEMENT, supranote 66, at 1718.
71. Genentech, 220 F.3d at 1352.
72. 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also BRCHFIEL SUPPLEMENT, supranote 66, at 1820.
73. Expressed sequence tags (ESTs) are obtained by sequencing a short stretch (either from
the 5' or 3' end) of a DNA clone obtained from a complimentary DNA (cDNA) library. cDNA
libraries are created by reverse transcribing mRNAs from a given cell into cDNA and then
inserting the cDNA clones into vectors for transformation of bacteria. Each bacterial colony
(clone) in the library contains a plasmid with a single cDNA and thus represents a single mRNA
from a single gene that was expressed at the time the cDNA library was created. ESTs are useful
in identifying genes expressed by a particular type of cell, especially diseased cells. See The
National Library of Medicine, The NCBI Handbook, Expressed Sequence Tags (ESTs),
availableat http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/bv.fcgi?rid=handbook.section.858.
74. Fisher,421 F.3d at 1373-74.
75. Molecules, supra note 56, at 196-97.
76. See id. at 198-99.

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 83:363

3. Enablement, Best Mode, and Nonobviousness
The Federal Circuit's strict utility requirement for biotech inventions goes hand in
hand with its equally strict disclosure requirements 77 for this technology. Some
commentators have proposed that the Federal Circuit has balanced these requirements
by rarely finding biotech inventions unpatentable due to obviousness.78
A disclosure must enable others skilled in the art to perform the invention and
provide the best mode for doing so. Over the years, the expected abilities of one skilled
in the art of biotechnology have changed, 79 essentially altering the enablement
requirements for such inventions. For example, before the advent of recombinant
technology, courts required the deposit of a sample of patented microorganisms to
satisfy the enablement requirement, 0 but a deposit is no longer required unless one
skilled in the art would need to perform "undue experimentation" to reproduce the
invention. 81 Similarly, to satisfy the best mode requirement, 82 the Federal Circuit has
required only "adequate disclosure;" inventors need not provide "a guarantee that
every aspect of the specification be precisely and universally reproducible."8'3 As with
the utility requirement, the major justification for the enablement requirement is the
concern that inventors might attempt to claim a broad genus of inventions without

77. A patent application must contain a written disclosure, which encompasses
a written descriptionof the invention, and of the manner and process of making
and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (emphasis added).
78. An invention is not patentable "if the differences between the subject matter sought to
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art." 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000); see also infra note 86.
79. For example, a person of ordinary skill in the art of recombinant technology would be
expected to be able to create recombinant organisms using well-known methods. See
BURCHFIEL, supra note 18, at 172.
80. Id.at 171.
81. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Ex parte Humphreys, 24
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255, 1261 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1992) (requiring deposit of a
microorganism containing an antibiotic-producing plasmid for enablement, not simply the
deposit of the plasmid); see also BURCHFIEL, supra note 18, at 173-75, 200-01. Although
deposit is no longer required, it is still a simple method for satisfying both the enablement and
best mode requirements for recombinant inventions. See BURCHFIEL, supra note 18, at 216; J.
Jason Williams, Special Project Note, Protecting the Frontiersof Biotechnology Beyond the
Genome: The Limits ofPatent Law in the Face of the ProteomicsRevolution, 58 VAND. L. REV.

955, 975-77 (2005) (observing that the Federal Circuit has relaxed its written description
requirements for biotech inventions if inventors deposit the invention publicly) (citing Enzo
Biochem., Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2002), vacated, 296 F.3d
1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
82. See BURCHFIEL, supra note 18, at 216.
83. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also
BURCHFIEL, supra note 18, at 175-76.
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actually making all of the forms of the invention as claimed.84 As a result, the Federal
85
Circuit has strictly enforced these disclosure requirements for biotech patents.
Typically, though, if the disclosure requirements in 35 U.S.C. § 112 are satisfied,
the Federal Circuit has not found biotech patents void for obviousness. 86 Interestingly,
Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have observed that the court has not imposed
the same stringent enablement and best mode requirements upon software patents as it
has upon biotech patents. 87 Disclosing the function of software is sufficient to satisfy §
112; the inventors do not need to disclose more specific features, such as source
code. 88 This makes sense given that biotech inventions incorporate natural elements
and are thus inherently unpredictable, while software inventions are entirely man-made
and much more predictable in their function.89

84. See BURCHFIEL, supra note 18, at 187-88. For example, one cannot vaguely claim any
DNA sequence producing a particular protein without disclosure of exact DNA sequences.
Claims to very general methods for creating recombinant organisms raise similar concerns. Id.
at 188. For a discussion of the dangers of overbroad patent rights in genomic research, see
Sandy M. Thomas, Genomics andIntellectualPropertyRights,4 DRUG DiscoVERY TODAY 134,
135-36 (1999).
85. See, e.g., Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Fiersrequired that a patent on
a human DNA sequence disclose the exact sequence and not merely a method of producing the
sequence (in this case, by reverse transcription from a particular species ofmRNA). Id.at 1171;
see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
BURCHFIEL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 66, at 92-95. Citing Fiers,the Federal Circuit held that
describing an invention as a strain of E. coli containing a human insulin gene obtained by
reverse transcription of the mRNA corresponding to this gene was not sufficient to satisfy the
written description and best mode requirements. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566-67; see also In re
Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding that claims to genetically engineered
cyanobacteria were too broad when 150 genera of bacteria were claimed, but only nine genera
and one particular species of cyanobacteria were disclosed); Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213 (finding
that claims to all DNA sequences capable of producing forms of erythropoietin were too broad);
BuRCHFIEL, supra note 18, at 191-94.
86. The Federal Circuit has only rarely found biotech inventions to be obvious in light of
the prior art. See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that a prior art
reference describing proteins related to cDNAs claimed in the patent at issue did not render
those claims obvious); Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 494 (holding that a reference suggesting that
cyanobacteria serve as good hosts for photosynthetic genes does not render claims to a
recombinant cyanobacterium containing non-photosynthetic genes obvious); BURCHFIEL
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 66, at 52-53; BURCHFIEL, supra note 18, at 98-100. But see Exparte
Goldgaber, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1172, 1173, 1176 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1995) (holding that
claims to a DNA clone that was complimentary to a gene was obvious in light of a reference
disclosing methods for producing probes that were complimentary to that gene); BURCHEIEL
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 66, at 53-55. One commentator argues that Deuel uprooted years of
patent policy, essentially ignoring § 103 in the context of "newly retrieved natural DNA
sequences." DUCOR, supra note 53, at 76.
87. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is PatentLaw Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1167-70, 1178-83 (2002).
88. Id. at 1162 (citing Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931,934 (Fed.
Cir. 1990)).

89. "[U]npredictability in performance of certain species or subcombinations other than
those specifically enumerated" is the primary justification for courts' refusal to enforce
chemical patents beyond the exact letter of the claims or disclosure. In re Smythe, 480 F.2d
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4. Claim Construction and Infringement
To determine if infringement has occurred literally or through the doctrine of
equivalents, 90 ajudge91 must consider the language of each claim, its specification, the
prosecution history, and any other relevant evidence in a process known as claim
construction. 92 Not surprisingly, in light of the Federal Circuit's stringent disclosure
93
requirements for biotech patents, the court has interpreted biotech claims narrowly,
although some district
courts and the Federal Circuit have occasionally departed from
94
this general rule.
5. The Big Picture
In general, the Federal Circuit has been loath to enforce biotech patents beyond the
exact letter of the disclosure and claims. This would seem to make issues of
infringement easy to decide-in general, if something is identical to what is claimed or
disclosed in the patent, it infringes, but if it varies at all (including by just a few amino
acids or nucleotides), it does not. Rare exceptions to this rule do exist, but no federal
court has ever held that a patent that only claims a recombinant protein also confers
monopoly rights with regard to its associated mRNA and DNA, or that a patent on a
particular method for cell transformation or PCR also covers the reagents utilized in
that method. Beyond the claims and disclosure, courts cut off protection.
However, such precursors, reagents, or other elements used to create a patented
biotech invention could constitute "components" of such a patented invention under §
271 (f) given the Federal Circuit's recent expansion of the § 271 (f) doctrine, even after
1376, 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (internal footnote omitted).
90. BURCHFIEL, supra note 18, at 239-40; see also infra note 102.
91. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,391 (1996) (holding that claim
construction "is an issue for the judge, not the jury").
92. E.g., Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815,818-19 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
93. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1561-62, 1569 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (defining the term "specific activity" narrowly with reference to an enzymatic
patent); Hormone Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(holding that claims indicating that the patented protein corresponded to a particular amino acid
sequence limited the claimed invention to only peptides with that exact sequence); BURCHFIEL,
supra note 18, at 245-48.

94. For an example of broad claim construction involving a protein patent, see Scripps
Clinic & ResearchFound.v. Genentech,Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding

that claim language covering "a human VIII:C preparation" covered both VIII:C that was
purified from human plasma and also recombinant human VIII:C). BURCHFIEL, supranote 18, at
245. In addition, a recent $65.2 million district court verdict in favor of Ariad Pharmaceuticals,
owner of a very broad patent claiming hundreds of methods of inhibiting nuclear transcription
factor NF-KB, has alarmed many in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries. Ken Garber,
Decision on NF-xB Patent Could Have Broad Implicationsfor Biotech, 312 ScI. 827, 827

(2006). Defendant Eli Lilly had obtained patents on two pharmaceuticals that inhibited NF-KB
activity years before the Ariad patent was issued. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly &Co., No. 0211280-RWZ, 2003 WL 21087115, at *1 (D. Mass. May 12, 2003). While the jury verdict has
not been reviewed by the Federal Circuit, it is potentially problematic for the manufacturers of
hundreds of pharmaceuticals that inhibit NF-rB in some manner. Garber, supra,at 827.
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the Supreme Court's limitation of the statute's reach in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp.95 As a result, a biotech patent holder might have more extensive rights
internationally than within the United States.96 Such a development threatens to uproot
the traditionally limited enforceability of biotech patents.
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL PATENT PROTECTION: 35 U.S.C. § 271 (F)
A. The Famous "Loophole"
Courts and legislators generally agree that patent protection granted within the
United States does not extend beyond its territories. 97 For many years, this limitation
was fairly simple to understand. However, after World War II, many American
businesses expanded abroad, and international infringement became much more of a
concern for many patent holders, 98 as competitors of a patentee could easily send
production of infringing articles overseas and thus avoid liability.
99
The Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Deepsouth PackingCo. v. Laitram Corp.
illustrated a significant gap in United States patent law. Laitram owned several
combination patents' °° on machines used to devein shrimp, 10 1 and Deepsouth had
manufactured infringing deveining machines and sold them within the United States

95. 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
96. It is interesting to note that the language of § 271(f) is similar to that contained in §
271(b) and § 271(c), statutes governing domestic infringement. Both § 271(b) and § 271(f)(1)
require active induction of infringement for liability, and both § 271(c) and § 271(f) assign
infringement liability for activities involving components of patented inventions:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United
States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000). However, the Federal Circuit has not addressed the effect of
expanding the definition of a § 271 (f) "component" on the scope of a § 271 (c) "component,"
and I will not address it in this Note.
97. Even as early as 1870, patent statutes contained territorial limitations on their
enforcement. Alan M. Fisch & Brent H. Allen, The Application of Domestic PatentLaw to
ImportedSoftware: 35 U.S.C. § 271(), 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 557, 559-60 (2004). Early
case law also reflected this limitation. See, e.g., In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826, 832
(C.C.P.A. 1935) (holding that use of a patented process in Russia did not infringe the patent,
because the patentee did not own a corresponding Russian patent, and United States patent laws
did not apply abroad); BURCHFIEL, supra note 18, at 311.
98. Fisch & Allen, supra note 97, at 561.
99. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
100. A combination patent protects "an invention that unites existing components in a novel
way." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1157 (8th ed. 2004).
101. "[Shrimp] carry their intestines, commonly called veins, in bags (or sand bags) that run
the length of their bodies .... [I]f the vein is removed, shrimp become more pleasing to the
fastidious as well as more palatable." Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 301 F. Supp.
1037, 1040 (E.D. La. 1969).
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and also internationally. The Supreme Court accepted the district court's finding that
Deepsouth had infringed Laitram's patent within the United States, 10 2 but refused to
hold that Deepsouth's international shipment
of the components of the patented
4
invention

0 3

constituted infringement.1

When Congress enacted § 271 () in 1984, the drafters explicitly stated that the new
statute was intended to "close a loophole in patent law."' 1 5 The original proposed form
of § 271(0 stated:
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in the United States
the material components of a patented invention, where such components are
uncombined in whole or in part, intending that such components will be combined
outside of the United States, and knowing that if such components were combined
within the United States the combination would be an infringement of the patent,
shall be liable as an infringer. 1°6
One patent official, Gerald Mossinghoff, expressed concern that the proposed statute
might prevent the exportation of components "suitable for substantial noninfringing
use."' 1 7 He also proposed removing the knowledge requirement, 08 because patent

102. "The patent provisions taken in conjunction with the judgment below also entitle
Laitram to the injunction it has received prohibiting Deepsouth from continuing to make or,
once made, to sell deveiners throughout the United States." Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 523 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Laitram Corp., 301 F. Supp. at 1059 (finding that Deepsouth
did not literally infringe Laitram's patent, but infringed under the doctrine of equivalents). A
court may find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents when a device performs
"substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result." Id. at
1058 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
103. Deepsouth had shipped deveining machines to international customers completely
assembled except for two parts and admittedly did so to avoid liability within the United States,
writing to one customer,
We are handicapped by a decision against us in the United States. This was a very
technical decision and we can manufacture the entire machine without any
complication in the United States, with the exception that there are two parts that
must not be assembled in the United States, but assembled after the machine
arrives in Brazil.
Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 523 n.5 (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d
928, 938 (5th Cir. 1971)).
104. "If Laitram has a right to suppress Deepsouth's export trade it must be derived from its
patent grant, and thus from the patent statute. We find that 35 U.S.C. § 271, the provision of the
patent laws on which Laitram relies, does not support its claim." Id. at 526 (internal footnotes
omitted). Laitram argued that Deepsouth should be liable for contributory infringement under
35 U.S.C. §271 (c), but the Court held that in the absence of direct infringement under 35 U.S.C
§ 27 1(a), contributory infringement did not take place. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 526. The Court
also rejected the Fifth Circuit's holding that manufacturing the components of Laitram's patent
and shipping them abroad with the intent that they be assembled constituted "mak[ing]" the
patented invention for the purposes of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a). Deepsouth,406
U.S. at 525-26.
105. 130 CONG. REC. 28,065, 28,069 (1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
106. S.1535, 98th Cong. § 1(1984).
107. Patent Law Improvements Act: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights,
& Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1535 & S. 1841, 98th Cong. 26 (1984)
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infringement within the United States does not require knowledge.' 9 Other hearing
witnesses agreed that courts would have an extraordinarily difficult time10proving that a
party knowingly committed infringement under these circumstances.'
The final enacted version of § 271(f) contains two slightly different subsections,
with subsection (1) requiring the international shipment of "all or a substantial portion
of the components of a patented invention" in a manner actively inducing the
combination of the components abroad, but not requiring knowledge,' and with
subsection (2) requiring the shipment of "any component ofa patented invention that is
especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use" with knowledge
that the component is adapted for use in the invention and intending that the
component will be incorporated into the patented invention abroad." 2 An infringer's
knowledge and intent to infringe are key in § 271(f)-if present, shipping a single
component specially adapted for incorporation into the patented invention is sufficient
to cause liability, even if the component is never incorporated into the patented
invention, under § 271(f)(2). "'
B. The Early Years of§ 271(1)
In the first years after the enactment of § 271 (f), courts focused on the subsection's
requirement that an infringer ship "components" abroad, thus applying the subsection
only to product patents that contained discrete components," 14 especially mechanical
devices. '15 Later, courts also applied § 271 (f) to non-mechanical inventions such as
chemical combination patents."'
[hereinafter 1984 Hearing] (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Assistant Secretary and
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, United States Patent and Trademark Office).
Mossinghoff also suggested that the bill include an exception to liability for the exportation of
staple articles of commerce. Id. at 26 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271 (c)(2000)). The enacted version of
the bill contains such a limitation in subsection (2). Infringement does not occur if the exported
component is "a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use." 35 U.S.C. § 271(0(2) (2000).
108. 1984 Hearing,supra note 107, at 26-27.
109. Knowledge is not required for liability for the direct infringement of a patent. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (2000). Knowledge is required for contributory infringement of a patent, but without an
act of direct infringement resulting from the act of contributory infringement, an infringer
cannot be held liable. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
110. See, e.g., 1984 Hearing,supra note 107, at 61-62 (statement of Bemarr R. Pravel,
president, American Intellectual Property Law Association).
111. 35 U.S.C. §271(f)(1) (2000).
112. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).

113. Id.
114. See Fisch & Allen, supranote 97, at 567-68. The idea that § 271(f) was meant to apply
only to product patents is supported by statements made during the pre-enactment hearing. See,
e.g., 1984 Hearing,supra note 107, at 60-62 (discussing the implications of proposed § 271 (f)

under the heading "Product Patent Rights").
115. See, e.g., T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F. Supp. 587, 593 (N.D. Okla. 1989)
(holding that shipping most of the components of a patented mechanical invention to Venezuela,
where they were combined into the final invention, violated §27 1(0(1)); Fisch & Allen, supra
note 97, at 568 n.50.
116. See Fisch & Allen, supra note 97, at 568-70. Recently, courts have rejected the
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However, courts refused to apply § 27 1(f) to process patents for many years due to
its explicit requirement that components of a patented invention be combined abroadto
constitute infringement. For example, in StandardHavens Products,Inc. v. Gencor
Industries,Inc., 7 the Federal Circuit refused to apply § 271 (f) to a company's foreign
sales of a machine that utilized a patented process.' 18 One common justification for this
refusal to apply § 271 (f) to process patents was another infringement statute, 35 U.S.C.
§ 27 1(g), " 9 which assigns liability
for the import, but not the export, of any product
0
made by a patented process.12
Courts also refused to extend § 27 1(f) liability to design patents, as such patents are
composed of a single, indivisible unit and thus do not contain multiple "components"
per se. 121 The Federal Circuit also refused to endorse § 271(f) liability when no
physical components of a patented invention were exported from the United States,
even when the2 2alleged infringer had exported the instructions to assemble infringing
items abroad.

C. Expanding§ 2 7169 Liability
In recent years, the Federal Circuit expanded the application of § 271(f) to
inventions containing intangible "components," starting with its decision in Eolas
Technologies,Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.'23 Eolas owned a software product patent 124 and
argument that § 271(f) only prohibits the export of components of mechanical combination
patents. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 95 Civ. 8833, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16895, at *6-*9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2001) (determining the identity of
components of a chemical product patent under § 271(f)); W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Intercat,
Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321 (D. Del. 1999) ("Nowhere in the statute or its legislative history is
there a limitation to components of machines and other structural combinations."); Lubrizol
Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 696 F. Supp. 302,325 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (issuing a preliminary injunction
preventing defendant from supplying a patented lubricant additive from the United States "for
combination in a lubricating composition outside the United States").
117. 953 F.2d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
118. Id.at 1374.

119. "Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or
uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States
shall be liable as an infringer.. . ." 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(g) (2000).
120. See, e.g., Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537, 538-39 (E.D. Va. 1998).
One district court found that § 271(g) provided evidence that Congress knew how to draft a
statute to protect against extraterritorial infringement of process patents and, therefore, must
have intended § 27 1(f) to apply only to product patents. Id.; see also Fisch &Allen, supra note
97, at 572. In Enpat,the court rejected several arguments later embraced by the Federal Circuit
in cases such as AT&Tand Eolas. See discussion infra Part II.C. Despite the fact that the process
patent involved "components" such as a computer server, the court concluded that § 271 (f) only
applied to the assembly of components of a product patent abroad. Enpat, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
121. See, e.g., Aerogroup Int'l, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd., 955 F. Supp. 220, 232
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that § 27 1(f) does not apply to a design patent for a shoe sole).
122. Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1117-18 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Even
given the recent expansion of § 271(f) liability, the Federal Circuit has never held that § 271(f)
applies to design patents. See id. ("[T]here can be no liability under § 271(f)(1) unless
components are shipped from the United States for assembly.").
123. 399 F.3d 1325, 1338-40 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
124. U.S. Patent No. 5,838,906 (filed Oct. 7, 1994).
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25
alleged that Microsoft's Internet Explorer browser infringed several of its claims.'
Section 271(f) was invoked because Microsoft had shipped golden master disks
containing the Windows operating system (which included Internet Explorer) to
international computer manufacturers that would then install Windows and Internet
Explorer on new computers.' 26 The court observed that the plain language of § 271(f)
does not impose a tangibility requirement upon components 27 and found that since the
unpatented software code contained on the golden master disks was essential to
a component of the final patented
Eolas's patented product, it could constitute
28
271(f).1
§
of
purposes
the
invention for
Later in 2005, in Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell
130
could be a component of a
Oil Co., 129 the Federal Circuit held that a catalyst

patented chemical process under § 27 1(f).' 31 The district court had held that Shell
directly and contributorily infringed Union Carbide's process patent with its catalysts
that performed the patented process, but excluded Shell's international sales of these
catalysts from its calculation of damages due to its conclusion that § 271(f) "[did] not
apply to process claims."' 32 The Federal Circuit held that § 271(f) could apply to
of damages that accounted for
process patents and remanded the case for a calculation
133
abroad.
catalysts
infringing
its
of
Shell's sales
The court revisited Eolas in AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.'34 and went even
further in attaching § 271(f) liability to intangible components of a product patent,
affirming a district court judgment that held Microsoft liable for infringement of
AT&T's software patent by installing Windows on foreign computers from copies of

125. Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1325.
126. Id.at 1331.
127. Id.at 1338-40.
128. Id.at 1339 ("Without this aspect of the patented invention, the invention would not
work at all and thus would not even qualify as new and 'useful."'). Also, the court first
considered the application of § 271(f) to process patents: "This court cannot construct a
principled reason for treating process inventions different than structural products." Id.
129. 425 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
130. A catalyst helps to increase the rate of a chemical reaction, "may or may not actually
take part chemically in the reaction," and usually will not be incorporated into the final reaction
product. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 350

(1993).
131. Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1381.
132. Id.at 1369.
133. Id.at 1381. Several members of the court dissented vigorously from the denial of
rehearing en banc, noting, "A component of a process is a step in the process; it is not the
physical material to be used in the process." Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v.

Shell Oil Co., 434 F.3d 1357, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, the court also has observed that
process patents seem less likely to be infringed under § 271(f). See NTP, Inc. v. Research in
Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[I]t is difficult to conceive of how one
might supply or cause to be supplied all or a substantial portion of the steps of a patented
method in the sense contemplated by the phrase 'components of a patented invention' insection
271(f) ....).
134. 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005). AT&T alleged that Microsoft had infringed its patent
on a particular type of "speech codec" (software for digitizing and replaying speech) through
features in its Windows operating system. Id.at 1367-68 & n. 1.
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golden master disks exported from the United States, 135 not the exported disks
themselves. Microsoft unsuccessfully argued that the software copied from the golden
master disks it had shipped abroad was manufactured abroad and thus was not
"supplied from the United States."' 136 In rejecting this argument, the court observed that
making copies was inherent in the nature of software, and thus, "the act of copying is
subsumed in the act of supplying, such that sending a single copy abroad with the
37
intent that it be replicated invokes § 271 (f) liability for those foreign-made copies. 4
Microsoft appealed the Federal Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court, and the
Court granted certiorari on October 27, 2006.138 Microsoft's petition for certiorari first
questioned whether software code should be considered a component under § 271 (f), 39
arguing that the expansion of liability under § 271(f) "eviscerate[s] the wellestablished 'right' of American software companies 'to compete with an American
patent holder in foreign markets, '140 exposing companies such as Microsoft to
increased international liability and
encouraging them to relocate research facilities
14 1
abroad to avoid § 271(f) liability.
Microsoft also argued that intangible attributes of an invention cannot be considered
components under § 271(f) because they are not "constituent part[s]" of the
invention 142 and cannot be "combined" with anything in the strictest sense of the
word.143 Finally, Microsoft disputed the panel's finding that the copies of the golden
master disk made abroad were supplied from the United States and thus infringed
under § 271(f). 44 Judging from the number of amicus curiae briefs filed in the case,
Microsoft's position had
more supporters than the expansive position adopted by the
45
Federal Circuit panel. 1

135. Id. at 1370. The court rejected Microsoft's argument that the software code simply
created the invention and thus was not a component for the purposes of § 271(t). Id. (citing
Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
136. Id.
137. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 467,467 (2006).

139. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746
(2007) (No. 05-1056), 2006 WL 403897. Microsoft argued that software code actually
constitutes design information and the Federal Circuit's expansion of liability would also
necessitate that "blueprints, formulas, and methodologies" would be components under §27 1(f).
Id.
140. Id. at 11 (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518,531 (1972)).
141. Id. at 11-12.
142. Id. at 15-16 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 466 (1993)).
143. The dictionary definition cited by Microsoft defines "combine" as "to join in physical
or chemical union." Id at 16 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 452 (1993)).

144. Id. at 18. Judge Rader dissented on these grounds from the Federal Circuit panel's
decision inAT&T, arguing that sending the golden master disk abroad was the only action that
could be considered "supplying" under § 271(f). AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d
1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting).
145. Numerous parties filed amicus curiae briefs in support of Microsoft. See, e.g., Brief
Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Reversal, Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056,2006 WL 3740618 (Dec. 15,2006); Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo!
Inc. in Support of Petitioner, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056,2006 WL 3723904
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D. Microsoft at the Supreme Court: Curtailingthe Expansion of§ 271()
The Supreme Court decided Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. on April 30, 2007,146
with seven Justices voting to reverse the Federal Circuit and with Justice Ginsburg
delivering the majority opinion.147 Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter. 48 The
majority boiled its analysis down to two key questions: "First, when, or in what form,
does software qualify as a 'component' under § 271(0? Second, were 'components' of
the foreign-made computers involved in this case 'supplied' by Microsoft 'from the
United States'? ' 149 In addressing these questions, the Court considered two different
possibilities for conceptualizing software-first, as "software in the abstract: the
instructions themselves detached from any medium,"' 50 and, second, as "a tangible
'copy' of software, the instructions encoded on a medium such as a CD-ROM.''
The majority adopted the first definition of software (or, "the notes of Beethoven's
Ninth") 152 and held that software in this form could not constitute a component under §
271(0 because "any software detached from an activating medium . .. remains
uncombinable."' 53 As a result, the Court held that the copies of Windows that were
made abroad from golden master disks exported from the United States and then were
installed onto foreign-made computers could not infringe AT&T's patent ' under
§
54
271(f) because they were not themselves "supplied from the United States."'
(Dec. 15, 2006); Brief of Shell Oil Company as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056, 2006 WL 3740358 (Dec. 15, 2006); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Eli Lilly and Co. in Support of Petitioner, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No.
05-1056, 2006 WL 3740360 (Dec. 15, 2006); Brief of Intel Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056, 2006 WL 3740361 (Dec. 15,
2006); Brief of Amazon.com, Inc., Mentor Graphics Corp. & Wacom Tech. Corp. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056, 2006 WL
3723905 (Dec. 14, 2006). Other parties, such as the American Intellectual Property Law
Association, filed amicus briefs that only disagreed with the Federal Circuit that copies of the
master disk made abroad are "supplied" from the United States. Brief of American Intellectual
Property Law Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp., No. 05-1056, 2006 WL 3746711, at *11 (Dec. 15, 2006).
146. 127 S.Ct. 1746 (2007).
147. Justice Ginsburg authored the majority opinion except as to footnote 14. Id.at 1750.
148. Justice Stevens sided with the Federal Circuit panel due to his belief that its decision
took into account Congress's intent in enacting § 271 (f)
to protect not only physical items such
as the deveining knife in Deepsouth,but also software in the abstract. Id.at 1762-63 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). "[I]f a disk with software inscribed on it is a 'component,' I find it difficult to
understand why the most important ingredient of that component is not also a component." Id.
at 1763.
149. Id.at 1753-54.
150. Id.at 1754. Justice Ginsburg analogized this concept of "software" to the "notes of
Beethoven's Ninth Symphony." Id.
151. Id.(analogizing this concept of "software" to "[s]heet music for Beethoven's Ninth").

152. Id.
153. Id.at 1755.
154. Id.at 1757 ("Under this formulation, the very components supplied from the United
States, and not copies thereof, trigger § 271(0 liability when combined abroad to form the

patented invention at issue."). Justice Ginsburg also favorably cited Judge Rader's dissenting
opinion protesting that supplying a component and copying a component were different actions
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In his concurrence, Justice Alito opined that Microsoft did not infringe AT&T's
patent under § 271 (f) because "no physical object originating in the United States was
combined with these computers... ." 55Justice Alito would have only found § 27 1(f)
infringement if the Windows CD-ROM needed to be present in a computer's CD-ROM
drive for the software to function properly--or,56in other words, if the CD-ROM disk
were physically combined with the computer.'
After Microsoft, information on its own cannot qualify as a "component" under §
271(f). However, as long as an information-based component of an invention is
exported in a physical form that could be used to create the final invention abroad, §
271(f) infringement can still occur.
Ill.SECTION 271(F) AND BIOTECH
Given the unique dual nature of many biotech inventions (in that they are tangible,
but also serve as an intangible medium for information storage and transmittal), 57
changes in the § 271(f) doctrine will affect biotech patents, but in a manner distinct
from both mechanical and software patents. Applying the statute to biotech inventions
could be very confusing given the current state of the doctrine. As a result, this Part
concludes that a biotech-specific amendment to § 271(f) would lend force to the
policies underlying § 271(f) without requiring courts to reanalyze the scope of the
statute's application in the complicated field of biotechnology.
A. Biology, Chemistry, andExtraterritoriality
Several district court cases illustrate the complexity that has accompanied the
application of § 271(f) to biotech and chemical patents in the past.
1. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,Inc.
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,158 one district court
began its analysis by identifying the patented chemical compound's § 271(f)
components 159 from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art of organic

and the ease of copying computer software did not mean that copying was the same as
supplying for the purposes of § 271(f) infringement. Id.at 1756-57 (citing AT&T Corp. v.
dissenting)). The Court
Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J.,
also relied upon the general presumption against extraterritoriality to justify its finding of noninfringement. Id.at 1758.
155. Id.
at 1762 (Alito, J., concurring).
156. Id.
157. See Symposium, Use of PatentedResearch Tools Abroad: Loophole or Liability?, 8
B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 218, 219 (2002) (analogizing information contained by the genetic code
to the informational content of software).
158. 95 Civ. 8833, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16895 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2001).
159. Id.
at *9-* 11. The court held that § 271(f) applied to chemical patents, despite the fact
that chemical compounds are "not generally described as having components." Id at *6-*9.
However, the court also observed that "conceptually it is difficult to apply 35 U.S.C. §27 1(f) to
patents for chemicals" because atoms, the smallest constituents of matter, make up patented
molecules. Id.at *7 n.3.
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chemistry, concluding that the core chemical structure and its side chains16 ° fit the
bill.161 The court then rejected Bristol-Myers Squibb's claims under § 271(0(1)
because only one of these components (the side chain,
in the form of its precursor
1 62
molecule) had been supplied from the United States.
One can extend the logic of Bristol-Myers Squibb to cases involving biotech
product patents, especially those claiming macromolecules such as genes and proteins.
Such molecules are considerably more complex than the small molecule at issue in
Bristol-MyersSquibb and thus would contain thousands of individual components as
defined in that case. As a result, following the Bristol-Myers Squibb court's analysis
to
63
the letter would be unmanageable in the context of biological macromolecules.
Redefining "components" from the viewpoint of a person of ordinary skill in the art
of biotechnology leads to several possible results. Genes are formed from individual
nucleotides, and proteins are formed from individual amino acids;164 so one might
classify these constituents as § 27 1() components. On a broader scale, researchers also
could classify large regions of gene or protein sequences as components of patented
products under § 271 (f). For example, distinct sections of a protein, known as domains,

160. An example (not the structure at issue in Bristol-Myers Squibb) of a simple core
chemical structure is a benzene ring:

C

A common side chain is an alcohol group: OH-

Under the court's analysis in Bristol-Myers Squibb, these "components" make up the following
compound (phenol):
0OH
161. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16895, at *9-*10. The court's conclusion
resulted from the testimony of both parties' expert witnesses, who testified that the core

structure and its side chain were the two "parts" or "components" of the patented molecule. Id.
at *10.
162. Id.at *1 -* 14. Section 271 (f)(1) requires that a "substantial portion" of the components
be supplied from the United States for infringement to occur. A single component supplied from
the United States is not sufficient to trigger § 271 (f)(1) liability. Id. (citing Windsurfmg Int'l v.
Fred Ostermann, GmbH, 668 F. Supp. 812, 819-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
163. Consider, for example, what would occur if a court followed Bristol-Myers Squibb in
classifying all of the attributes of a single nucleic acid base, adenine, as §271 (f) components of
a recombinant DNA invention:

<N

N

N:N
H

Likely, each of the rings would be a component, in addition to the amine (NH 2) side chain.

Considering that all bases would thus contain three or four components, a typical gene that is
1200 nucleotides in length would contain approximately five thousand components. See
WATSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 42-43.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
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often have specific functions that are enzymatic or structural in nature.1 65 Furthermore,
166
a particular amino acid sequence encoding a membrane-spanning protein domain
serves as a component of a complete protein in the same manner that a side chain is a
component of a small molecule-the
amino acid sequence is essential to certain
67
properties of the protein.
Similarly, many genes also contain distinct functional units. These functional units
can occur within the protein-coding region itself as exons 168 or within nontranscribed
genetic sequences, including introns,169 regulatory sequences such as promoter regions,
and other control regions.170 From this perspective, one can see how inventions created
with the tools of biotechnology 171 could be made up of distinct genetic or protein
components that form the final product 172 but are larger than single nucleotides or
amino acids.
In addition to classifying physically distinct regions of a molecule as components
under § 271 (f), Bristol-Myers Squibb contains an additional layer of analysis. After
deciding that the core structure and the side chain ofthe patented compound were its §
271 (f) components, the court then assumed that precursor molecules (the compounds
from which the patented compound was produced) to each of these components also
were components under § 271(f).' 73 Classifying both intangible elements and
unpatented precursor molecules as § 271(f) components opens the door to conferring
this crucial status on unpatented precursors that are used to create a patented biotech
invention but do not become a physical part of it. In the biotech context, such
unpatented precursor "components" might include a DNA sequence encoding a

165. See GARuaTr & GRIsHAM, supra note 29, at 120-26.

166. See id. at 115.
167. Membrane-spanning domains are essential to the formation of many different proteins
that interact with membranes, such as ion transporters. See id. at 301-03. Another example of a
protein domain with a distinct function is the heme-binding protein domain contained within the
oxygen-transport proteins hemoglobin and myoglobin. See id. at 480-81.

168. An exon is a region of a eukaryotic gene which is represented in the final mRNA and
exits the nucleus for translation in the cytoplasm of a cell. Regions of a gene that are removed
from the final mRNA are known as introns. See WATSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 137. The
exon/intron organization of eukaryotic genes allows for greater efficiency in genetic information
storage, as a single gene may produce several different mRNAs based on differential splicing.

See id. at 140. In some cases, exons even correspond to functional protein domains when
expressed. Id. at 140-41.
169. See supra note 168.
170. A promoter region of DNA binds to RNA polymerase enzyme to initiate transcription
of a gene. See WATSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 51.
171. See DucoR, supranote 53, at 62 (describing the creation of chimeric biotech inventions,
such as genes or expression vectors, by combining large portions of preexisting genetic
material); supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
172. For example, if researchers are interested in creating a chimeric hybrid of genes A and
B, and both genes contain the same restriction site, they could cut the genes with that restriction
enzyme and then combine the 5' end of A with the 3' end of B to create a patentable invention.
The final A-B hybrid would contain physical parts of both precursors, and, thus, the precursors
would be classified as components under § 271 (f).
173. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 95 Civ. 8833, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16895 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2001), at *11.
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patented recombinant protein or an expression vector used in the creation of a patented
cell line.
In light of the Federal Circuit's very specific disclosure requirements for biotech
patents and its reluctance to allow biotech patent enforceability beyond the exact letter
of the claims or disclosure,1 74 this approach should disturb the reader. Courts could
prohibit the export of unpatented biological precursors, thus allowing more substances
to be protected by the patent abroad than would be protected within the United States.
Even after the Supreme Court's Microsoft decision somewhat curtailed the
expansion of § 271(f), subsection (f)(1)'s requirement that exported components be
"combined" abroad for extraterritorial liability remains almost nonexistent. Instead, an
17 5
exported component must only be utilized to manufacture a patented product abroad,
but not necessarily "combined" with anything, to violate the statute. 176 Just like
software on a master disk, an unpatented gene sequence is not combinedwith anything
per se to produce a patented protein, but instead indicates the design of the final
product to a cell's transcription and translation machinery. 77 Eliminating the
combination requirement seems likely to move the Federal Circuit
even further away
78
from its previously narrow construction of biotech patents.1
The expansion of the definitions of "component" and "combination" also greatly
affects the scope of § 271 (f)(2) in its application to biotech product patents. Subsection
(f)(2) only requires intent to combine at least one specially adapted component "in a
manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United
States,"' 179 but when the court has already stripped "combination" of all its usual
meaning, all that remains is the requirement that an infringer intend to utilize the
component in some manner to form the final invention for § 271(f)(2) liability. Not
requiring proof of assembly for liability under this subsection alleviates the burden of
proof on the patentee, but allowing liability for infringement, even if actual
combination has not taken place, further expands the rights of biotech patent holders,
rights that the Federal Circuit has previously limited.

174. See supra Part I.B.
175. See Molecules, supranote 56, at 196 ("A 'tangible' now seems to mean 'useful,' rather
than something material."); supra Part II.D.
176. Of course, after Microsoft, the exported component itself must be utilized for the
production of the final product to invoke § 27 1(f). Copies of a component made abroad do not
violate the statute. However, the Court did not contest the fact that if the exported disks
themselves had been utilized to install Windows and Internet Explorer on the foreign computers,
Microsoft would have clearly violated § 271(f), despite the fact that the software has not really
been "combined" per se with anything except the hardware and software on the computer. See
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1755 (2007).
177. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
178. See supra Part I.B.
179. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (2000); see also Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d
1364, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that § 271(f)(2) only requires intent to combine, thus
not requiring proof of actual combination).
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2. Columbia University v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH
The expansion of§ 271(f) liability will also affect biotech process patents in unique
80
ways. One district court decision, Columbia University v. Roche DiagnosticsGmbH,1
addressing § 271 (f) infringement of biotech process patents would likely have turned
out differently
today after the combined decisions of Eolas, AT&T, and Union
181
Carbide.
In Columbia, the court held that the export of a protein-producing cell line did not
infringe a process patent claiming the cell line production method, because § 271(f) did
not apply to process patents, and thus, the exported materials were not components
under the statute.' 82 Columbia had unsuccessfully argued that these actions infringed
its patent under § 271(f) because the exported cell line and the protein it produced were
"the functional equivalent" of components because they contained "substantially all the
components183 needed to manufacture the EPO protein and create new cells and
products."'
If Columbia were decided today, its outcome would be different. A court could
easily classify attributes of patented inventions (including process inventions after
Union Carbide) as components under § 271(f), though they do not easily fall within
the dictionary definition of "component." Thus, a judge could classify the exported cell
line, which the patentees claimed was the "functional equivalent" of a component, as a
component under § 271 (f), therefore opening the door to liability under subsections
(f)(1) and (f)(2) if their other requirements were satisfied.
B. Biotech and ExtraterritorialityToday
Expanding the definition of "component" under § 271(f) could produce a wide
variety of outcomes in a biotech context, depending on how a particular judge decides
to define this term. As discussed in Part III.A, many different ways of breaking biotech
inventions into "components" exist. In addition, the application of the statute becomes
even more confusing when one considers the wide variety of biotech-based inventions

180. 150 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D. Mass. 2001).
181. Components of both patented processes and products could be intangible for § 271(f)
analysis, especially with regard to fields of technology in which products and processes are
interchangeable. "[S]ound policy again counsels against varying the definition of'component of
a patented invention' according to the particular form of the part under consideration,
particularly when those parts change form during operation of the invention as occurs with
software code." Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Biotech inventions also fit this mold, as product and process patents often cover much of the
same technology. For example, a product patent could cover a recombinant protein itself, while
a process patent might cover the expression system used to produce the protein.
182. Columbia, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 204-05 (citing Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor
Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Aerogroup Int'l, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks,
Ltd., 955 F. Supp. 220, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). The court held that for infringement under §
271 (f), components themselves must be noninfiinging and uncombined in some manner upon
export before being combined into a "greater, infringing compound" after export. See id.at 204
n.35.
183. Id. at 204.
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and how differences in their composition could cause the strength of § 271(0's
protection to vary.
For purposes of this analysis, I will consider five distinct varieties of biotech
inventions: DNA-based inventions created using PCR techniques, DNA-based
inventions created using recombinant techniques (e.g., restriction enzymes), proteins
produced from laboratory-engineered genes, genetically engineered cell lines that
perform some special function (e.g., produce a particular protein or contain some
particular plasmid), and laboratory methods.
The tangibility of precursors to these inventions falls generally into three categories,
illustrated in Figure 1. First, inventions with completely intangible precursors or
components-those that are purely informational and serve only as a template for
identical copies-would include PCR-based inventions, including cell lines created
using PCR and methods performed using PCR. These precursors are similar in nature
to the exported golden master disk in Microsoft, copies of which were made abroad
and then were utilized to install Windows onto foreign computers. The initial exported
copy itself was not installed onto any computers.
Next, inventions with dual-nature precursors would include all patents claiming
recombinant proteins. Precursor DNA must be "combined" with cellular protein
expression machinery to produce the final protein product. Precursors to these
inventions are equivalent to the golden master disk in Eolas, which was exported from
84
the United States and then used to install Windows on the foreign computers itself.1
Such inventions could also include cell lines that produce proteins in this manner and
methods incorporating these techniques.
Finally, inventions with completely tangible precursors would include what I term
"recombinant inventions"--those created through recombinant DNA technology such
as restriction enzymes. For example, when a chimeric gene is created with restriction
enzymes and ligase, the two "halves" of the gene become aphysical part of the final
product.185 As above, this category also could include engineered cell lines containing
genes created using this recombinant technology and any methods utilizing these
techniques.

184. See Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1338-39.
185. See supra note 172.
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Increasing tangibility of precursors/components
Inventions with completely
intangible precursors (not
"combined" in any sense to

Inventions with dual-nature
precursors ("combined" in the
Microsoft sense to form the final

form the final product)

Cell lines (those created by
PCR)

product, but do not physically
become part of the final
product)
Proteins created from
laboratory-created gene
sequences
Cell lines (those producing a
recombinant protein)

Methods performed involving
PCR techniques

Methods of recombinant protein
expression

PCR inventions

Inventions with completely
tangible precursors (physically
combined with other
components to form the final
product)
Recombinant inventions

Cell lines (those containing
recombinant DNA sequences
such as plasmids)
Methods of creating
recombinant inventions

Figure 1. Tangibility of the components of different biotech inventions.

1. Pre- and Post-MicrosoftApproaches to Biotech Extraterritoriality
The flaws in both the Federal Circuit's pre-Microsoft approach and the approach
taken by the Supreme Court in that case are illustrated by the results that would occur
when applying these schemes to the three broad categories of biotech inventions
illustrated in Figure 1. Consider the first category. A sample of DNA that is exported
and later amplified abroad using PCR techniques in order to produce a patented
invention abroad would have been considered a component under the Federal Circuit's
AT&T decision, but not by the Supreme Court majority that reversed it.
In a biotech context, Microsoft draws a line at whether the PCR is performed in the
United States or abroad (or, whether the exported component itself or a copy of it made
abroad is used to create the patented invention). If it is performed abroad, the would-be
infringer is free from infringement liability. If not, the patentee can sue under § 271 (f).
However, PCR is a relatively simple procedure that can be performed in several hours
in any modem biology laboratory, and to draw a line between PCR performed in the
United States and PCR performed abroad seems absurd, especially when drawing that
line could mean millions of dollars in infringement damages.
Both pre- and post-Microsoft, the statute seems to clearly prohibit the export of
precursors to the second category of inventions (those with a dual intangible/tangible
nature), such as DNA that is later used to produce a protein abroad. However, as
discussed in Part III.A, allowing the use of unpatented precursor molecules to violate §
271(f) runs contrary to the Federal Circuit's traditionally narrow biotech patent
protection. 186 If the DNA used to produce a patented protein is unpatented and thus
unprotected in the United States, its export should not invoke infringement liability,
and yet such exportation would do just that under the current § 271(f) doctrine.

186. See supra Part I.B.
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The final category of inventions, those created using completely tangible
precursors, would quite clearly have fallen within the ambit of the statute almost from
its inception.' 87 If two different DNA molecules are digested with a restriction enzyme
and used to create a new, chimeric molecule, the precursor DNA moleculesphysically
become part of the final invention and would thus be considered components in the
true sense of the word. Considering the precursors of such inventions to be components
under § 271(f) is the only situation that does not seem to uproot the Federal Circuit's
narrow biotech patent protection.
2. Potential Legislative Responses
The preceding analysis indicates how § 271 (f) might produce confusing results even
when applied to different types of inventions within the same field of technology.
Indeed, many agree that Congress should consider amending or repealing § 271(f) in
89
88
light of its poorly defined language' and its potentially harmful economic effects.'
Members of Congress seem eager to tackle the problem-in 2005, a proposed
amendment to § 271(f) that failed to pass would have required that components be
tangible, 190 and another current bill proposes the complete repeal of § 271(f). 191
However, in introducing the 2006 bill, Senator Orrin Hatch offered little justification
that § 271(f) "benefits
for the need to repeal § 271(f) except for the vague statement
92
foreign manufacturers and patentees in some situations."',
Others have suggested that increased international protection ofthe rights ofUnited
States patentees makes § 271 (f) obsolete. 193 The most significant agreement addressing
international patent protection is commonly known as TRIPS, 194 which became
effective in 1995 between members of the World Trade Organization.9 9 TRIPS

187. See supra Part II.B.
188. See Catherine Tomabene, Note, The Export-Import Dilemma: Inventions and
Employment Abroad, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 176 (2006).
189. See Donald S. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP.

L. 336, 347 (2005).

190. The proposed amendment would have added a third subsection to § 271(f):
(3) An item supplied in or from the United States is not a "component" under this
section unless the item is a tangible item that is itself combined physically with
other components to create the combination that is alleged to infringe.
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, 109th Cong., Patent Reform Act of
2005, § 10 (2005), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/DraftPatentStatute
DDC.pdf.

191. See Brief for the Petitioner, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056, 2006 WL
3693463, at *29 n.7 (citing Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006)).
192. 152 CONG. REC. S8829, S8830 (daily ed. Aug. 3,2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
193. See Zaunbrecher, supra note 27, at 52-53; cf Harold C. Wegner, Microsoft

Extraterritoriality: "Mutiny . . . Heresy", 25 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 659, 667 (2006)
(explaining that § 271(f) and the need for true international patent protection resulted from the
same policy considerations of protecting innovation abroad).
194. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Uruguay

Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade
in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
195. Paroma Basu, International Patent Law: Boon or Bane of Biotech?, 23
BIOTECHNOLOGY 13, 13 (2005).
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mandated minimum standards of protection for all forms of intellectual property in
WTO member countries, thus addressing the significant problem of very weak patent
protection in many developing countries that previously made them ideal locations to
utilize technology patented in other nations.196
However, while TRIPS certainly has decreased the prevalence of international
patent infringement, its reach is still not absolute. A grace period built into TRIPS
gives less-developed signatory countries a longer period of time in which to become
compliant, thus making these locations more attractive to those seeking to avoid the
patent laws of TRIPS-compliant nations in the next decade.1 97 As a result, complete
reliance on this system (as suggested by some supporting § 271(f)'s repeal) seems
unlikely to solve all the problems of extraterritorial patent infringement in the shortterm future.
i. Tangibility-Based § 271(f) Amendment
Thus, throwing out § 271 (f) completely seems premature. Congress instead could
amend the statute to simplify its application to new technologies.' 98 One option would
be to create more general tangibility requirements for components in one of three
ways, illustrated in Figure 2. First, Congress could allow the term "component" to
apply to all unpatented elements of a patented invention, regardless of tangibility. (This
would overrule Microsoft.) Such an approach gives courts little guidance in
determining what is properly classified as a component of a patented invention under §
271(f).
Another option would be to allow "component" to apply only to unpatented
elements that are at least somewhat tangible. This would apply the Supreme Court's
holding in Microsoft to other fields of technology besides software. Completely
intangible components, such as source code (or an initial DNA sample used in PCR),
would be excluded under such a regime, but code on a physical disk or dual-nature
precursors to biological molecules (such as unpatented DNA that encodes a patented
protein) could be components. Finally, the statute could be redrafted to allow
"component" to apply only to unpatented elements that arephysically incorporated into
the final patented invention. (This is Justice Alito's proposed approach in his Microsoft
concurrence.)199

.196. See id.
197. See id. For example, nations in sub-Saharan Africa have until January 2016 to become
TRIPS-compliant. Id.
198. After all, the range of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101(a) has always
expanded to encompass new technologies. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192-93
(1981) (holding that a process accomplished through the use of computer software was
patentable subject matter); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980). Thus, the
rest of patent doctrine, especially infringement doctrine, must expand accordingly to
accommodate the new technology.
199. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1762 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
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Figure 2. Continuum of tangibility for redrafted § 271(f).

The third option could be a beneficial choice for biotech, given the generally narrow
approach to these patents adopted by the Federal Circuit and other courts. 200 Many
biological precursors that likely would be classified as components under an expansive
interpretation of § 27 1(f) 201 are themselves patentable if they meet the statutory
requirements, and so to extend protection to include unpatented precursors (that are
either barred from patentability or off-patent) that are not physically incorporated into
the final patented product would contradict many years of biotech jurisprudence. This
option would not completely exclude biotech patents from § 271(f) protection, but
would only apply to components that physically became part of the final patented
invention.
Although such a tangibility-based amendment to § 27 1(f) might ease the statute's
application to biotechnology, it would probably not solve the problems discussed in
this Note permanently, as technology continues to advance and to pose new,
unforeseen challenges in patent law.
ii. Technology-Based § 271(f) Amendment
A second option could be to create technology-specific § 271(f) variations.
Although TRIPS prohibits signatory countries from varying levels of patent protection
for different technologies,2 °2 Congress has previously created patent provisions that
help alleviate special issues posed by inventions in particular fields.20 3 On balance, this

200. See supra Part I.B.

201. See supra Part III.B.1.
202. TRIPS, supra note 194, at art. 27.
203. Although much of the Patent Act utilizes broad language in order to encompass
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seems to be the best option to address biotech patent issues caused by the expansion of
§ 271 (f) liability, as it allows the specific nuances of this technology to be addressed in
the § 271(f) context without relying on a generic provision that may affect different
technologies in different ways.
Such a biotech-specific addendum to § 271 (f) could add a third subsection to define
the scope of the statute with regard to these patents:
(3) For patents disclosing or claiming a patented invention which is primarily
manufactured or performed using genetic material (DNA or RNA), proteins, cellculture or cloning techniques, or other processes involving site-specific genetic
manipulation techniques, a substance supplied in or from the United States is not a
"component" under this section if it is an unpatented informational precursor from
which the patented invention is produced or with which a patented process is
performed2 4and it is not physically incorporated into the final, patented
invention. 0
CONCLUSION
Adding subsection (3) to § 271(f) would eliminate the possibility of conferring
international patent protection that exceeds domestic patent protection upon unpatented
precursors such as DNA samples used abroad to create or practice patented biotech
inventions. 0 5 However, it still would protect against the export of components that are
incorporated physically into a final patented invention abroad. Thus, § 271(f) still
would apply to biotech inventions, albeit within a very limited context that allows
policies underlying the Federal Circuit's narrow interpretation of these patents 206 to
retain force.
The nature of technology mandates that Congress take action regarding this issue.
The statute clearly cannot be left as it is, inviting wildly divergent and increasingly
expansive interpretations 2°7 based on its vague language and relatively uninformative
legislative history.208 Indeed, whenever new, previously unforeseen fields of
technology arise in the future, Congress could enact technology-specific subsections
similar to the one proposed in this Note addressing § 271(f) that would ease the
statute's application to inventions in those fields of technology.
This approach could help Congress alleviate future problems in interpreting the
broad language of § 271(f) without scrapping or redrafting the entire system, which, on
the whole, still provides useful protection for United States patents when other systems
of international patent protection might fail.
technologies not yet invented, Congress also has included technology-specific provisions in
areas in which interpretation of the law has been confusing or inequitable. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(1) (2000) (permitting importation of patented inventions "solely for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products").
204. This proposed subsection incorporates language from 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(e)(l) and draft §
271(0(3) from the Patent Reform Act of 2005. See source cited supra note 190.
205. Unpatented biological precursors might also include physical components of a
precursor product, such as a protein produced from a chimeric gene. See supra notes 164-72
and accompanying text.
206. See supra Part I.B.
207. Compare supra Part II.B with supra Part II.C.
208. See supra Part II.A.

